A database driven multi-agent model has been developed with automated access to US bank level FDIC Call Reports which yield data on balance sheet and off balance sheet activity, respectively, in 
Multi-Agent Financial Network (MAFN) Model of US Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO): Regulatory Capital Arbitrage, Negative CDS Carry Trade and Systemic Risk Analysis

Introduction
The 2007 financial crisis which started as the so called 'sub-prime' crisis in the US has had severe global repercussions. There has been a contraction in output and employment, bank bailouts 2 , increased tax burdens and accelerated fiscal austerity to levels not previously recorded since the Great Depression. The crisis has exposed shortcomings of monetary economics (Buiter, 2009 ) and the regulatory framework of Basel II (Brunnermier et al.,2009 , Hellwig, 2010 , Markose, 2011 . Eichengreen (2010) has concluded that "fundamentally, the (2007) crisis is the result of flawed regulations and perverse incentives in financial markets". Macroeconomic modelling and its use in policy analysis have come under heavy criticism. Critics have accused macroeconomists of an insidious reliance on a particular class of macroeconomic models that has abstracted away institutional details and financial interconnections in the provision of liquidity, capital adequacy and solvency (Wieland, 2010 , Colander et al.2009 ). Most of all, what is prominent is the absence of a framework to deal with regulatory and market failure arising from the negative externalities from excessive credit creation and leverage. On the operational front, serious deficits remain in the economics curricula in not providing integrated quantitative tools for holistic visualization and monitoring of the financial system to identify systemic risk threats from activities of financial firms.
Further, central tenets of the regulatory framework were and continue not to be stress tested in an ongoing way to see if they are prone to creating perverse incentives. The main objective of this paper is to provide an exemplar of a quantitative integrative financial framework using multi-agent modelling which can monitor and analyse systemic risk from activities of financial intermediaries within the context of the regulatory incentives and prevailing market conditions.
The specific institutional propagators of the 2007 crisis involved residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) which had grown to over $8.5 trillion in the US alone by 2006 (Figure 1 ), surpassing US securities and corporate bonds. This whole asset class suffered considerable impairment of market value with the collapse of US house prices. Except for government agency issues, post 2008, new issuance of MBS has dropped to almost zero. The build up of systemic risk occurred in two distinct phases. In the first 'originate and distribute' phase of securitization of bank loans, banks followed an aggressive strategy of loan portfolio expansion by overcoming restrictions placed by the size of a bank's deposit base by reissuing the capital released from securitization into new mortgages/loans. This regulatory arbitrage which placed securitized assets off balance sheet in special purpose vehicles (SPV) in order to reduce the 8% minimum capital requirement of the Basel I Accord has been found by many (see, Goderis et. al. (2007) ) to enable banks to achieve 50% higher loan target levels and reduce equity capital to asset ratio to about 5.3% as opposed to the 9.8% for those that did not. The second phase of the crisis involved an accelerated growth of RMBS, especially in its subprime form, as collateral in structured collateralized debt obligations (CDO) 3 held as bank assets and in bank liabilities in conduits such as asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) in short term repo markets. The liquidity crunch is seen as a run on the repo market. As noted by Gorton and Metrich (2009) outdated models of money and banking prevented central banks and supervisory bodies from seeing the $12 trillion procyclically sensitive collateralized securities in the repo and shadow banking system as being part of the fractional system of private credit creation which will suffer convertibility problems vis-à-vis central bank regulated funds and reserves for which the tax payer remains liable.
Emphasizing the problem of how the above individually rational activity of financial institutions aimed at expanding their loan market share will undermine system stability, Jones (2000) , from the
Division of Research and Statistics of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, stated
"absent measures to reduce incentives or opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage, over time such developments could undermine the usefulness of formal capital requirements as prudential policy tools". Jones noted that regulatory capital arbitrage has attracted scant academic attention, or for that matter as a key aspect of regulatory design, and appears to think that this is due to a lack of sufficient time series data which impedes econometric analysis of regulatory capital arbitrage. If econometric models are not up to the task of modelling regulatory capital arbitrage due to limited data points, are there no other tools to test bed regulatory systems?
About the second phase in RMBS developments, the question that has often been asked is, in a period which started with the 'originate and distribute' model of remote securitization and regulatory focus on Credit Risk Transfer (CRT), how did so much RMBS assets and their credit risk accumulate within banks themselves? Indeed, the extraordinary transfer of $1.5 trillion MBS from balance sheets of US financial intermediaries directly on to that of the Federal Reserve in March 2010 to purge the system of toxic assets marks an on going fall out from the crisis. 3 Of the $8.5 trillion mortgage backed securities (see Figure 1 ) over 85% of outstanding $2 Trillion CDOs at its peak in 2007 (see, Figure 2 ) was collateralized by MBS and about half of this was subprime RMBS. Gorton (2009, Obligations ; Non-Agency MBS includes RMBS and CMBS Acharya and Richardson (2010) state that "what made the current crisis so much worse than the crash of 2000 was the behaviour of many of the large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) . .. These
LCFIs ignored their own business model of securitization and chose not to transfer the credit risk to other investors" (italics added). While Acharya and Richardson (2010) appear to acknowledge that
LCFIs by retaining RMBS securities on their balance sheets along with CDS 5 guarantees allowed banks to save capital, they neither attribute this to the regulatory incentives in place nor show how profitable this was for banks in the short run, a matter which is the key to any myopic business model.
Stultz (2010 p. 80) admits to the regulatory incentives in place with the onset of the ratings based risk weighted and CRT orientation of Basel II which marked the development of synthetic securitization.
By and large, there seems to have been a fundamental misunderstanding among a number of economists about the advanced state of the adoption of reduced capital requirements for retained RMBS on bank balance sheets with synthetic securitization and CRT in US banks following from the Joint Agencies Rule 66 Fed. Reg. 56914 and 59622 which became effective on January 1, 2002. Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008) quite rightly state: "understanding causality is a precondition 5 CDS involve a bilateral contract between a buyer and the CDS protection seller who pays the buyer the gross notional value of the reference asset less the recovery rate at the time of the credit event which is typically default. The CDS buyer pays periodic premia called the CDS spread. 6 Cannata and Quaglianello ( 2009) seem to have some misconceptions about the factors behind the genesis of the modifications to Basel I with risk weighted capital requirements and the role of the US in initiating them as early as 1999, as they go on to state: " Basel II, our suspect, was not on the crime scene or, rather, showed up later. In the United States, the epicentre of the financial crisis, the introduction of the new prudential discipline has been postponed (so far) to 2010 and will involve a limited number of banks. In Europe, the actual use of the new rules was very limited in 2007, when the crisis erupted. Indeed, most banks exploited the provisions of the Capital Requirements Directive (which implemented Basel II in the EU) which allowed them to defer to 2008 the application of the new Framework. … The financial turbulence occurred under the "old" Basel framework, making very palpable its shortcomings, particularly its low risk-sensitivity and the scarce adaptability to financial innovation." Lall(2009) This paper addresses the need to develop new computational and simulation based methodologies to track bank balance sheet and off balance sheet activity of financial intermediaries in response to changes in regulatory policy and also due to competitive co-evolutionary pressures to grow market share. Markose (2005) has advocated the use of a complex adaptive system perspective, the sine qua non of which is strategic innovation or novelty production within a Red Queen type arms race between participants. Traditional policy related models, often in the stochastic control or dynamic programming framework ignore this facet of competitive co-evolution. As in other complex adaptive systems such as biological ones, the Red Queen competitive co-evolution is known to be rampant among market participants and between regulators and regulatees. The implications of this for regulatory arbitrage endemic to the current financial crisis should be noted. Indeed, the nail in the coffin of large scale macro-econometric models came with the Lucas Critique on the capacity of a rule breaking private sector which can anticipate policy and negate policy or jeopardize the system by a process of regulatory arbitrage (see, Markose, 2005, Sections 3 and 4) . Such strategic behaviour results in a lack of structural invariance of the equations being estimated, highlighting the restrictiveness of econometric modelling for policy analysis.
Agent based computational economics or ACE using the acronym coined by Leigh Tesfatsion (see, Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006 ) is based on object oriented programming that can produce agents that are both inanimate (eg. repositories of data bases) as well as behavioural agents capable of varying degrees of computational intelligence. These range from fixed rules to fully adaptive agents representing real world entities (such as banks or consumers) in artificial environments which can be replicas of, for instance, the financial system. Recently, many have emphasized the uses of ACE simulation platforms for digital mapping of the financial system, stress testing policy and for institutional design (see, Buchanan, 2009 and Markose, 2011) . These artificial environments can depict real time orientation, institutional rules, and also complex interactions. For the simulation framework to be useful for assessment of policy, financial firm level responses must be modelled in the context of prevalent market conditions and with automated access to balance sheet and offbalance sheet data to anchor the financial decisions being simulated. Further, the interactions of agents produce system wide dynamics that are not restricted to pre-specified equations which have to be estimated using past data in econometric or time series approaches. In an agent-based model, each agent follows explicit rules or strategies under specified market conditions and a 'probe' monitors causal internal workings and also aggregates outcomes. In contrast, the main draw-back of estimation based equation analyses is that structure changes from strategic behaviour and tracing of causal links are almost impossible to do. Finally, we aim to represent CDS financial obligations of the US banks in a financial network format to identify systemic risk consequences of topological structures showing concentration of interaction between a few highly interconnected banks.
To our best knowledge the IBM MIDAS project (see, Balakrishnan et. al. 2010) Markose (2012, forthcoming) which is based on the talk at the IMF on 7 December 2011 on "Systemic Risk From Global Financial Derivatives : A Network Analysis of Contagion and Its Mitigation With a Super-spreader Tax". Here, it is shown how negative externalities in the way of systemic risk from the failure of highly interconnected financial intermediaries can be measured and penalized using the eigenvector centrality measure. These sources can be referred to for details on financial networks which are omitted in this paper.
Peter (2010) and Fricke and Lux (2012) who use empirical bilateral interbank data have highlighted the core-periphery network structure in financial systems. Markose et. al. (2010) were among the first to show how such structures propagate contagion in a radically different way to random networks.
Thus, while the stability of financial networks has been usually investigated using the classic Furfine (2003) algorithm, it is only recently that economists have renewed efforts to understand and quantify how contagion propagates in highly tiered and clustered financial networks which imply sparse matrices with heterogeneity in connectivity and exposures that can be modeled by power law distribution (see, Moussa, 2011) . Finally, the idea that nodes in the network which constitute financial intermediaries and other financial actors are themselves intelligent 'agents' operating within constraints and incentives provided by the markets and regulations has not been fully operationalized yet. Markose (2011) has referred to models that aim to digitally map the financial system from large firm level data bases as multi-agent financial network (MAFN) models.
This paper will focus extensively on the decision problem confronting the US FDIC banks involved in both CDS and RMBS markets in the 2006-7 period. We then show, on the basis of market shares of US banks in the CDS market, that it implies a too interconnected to fail network topology which is a source of systemic risk. The structural weakness in modern risk sharing institutions arising from too much concentration of market share among a few broker-dealers, is a matter which was first raised by Darby (1994) in the case of derivatives markets in general. Many have since noted (see, Persuad (2002), Lucas et. al. (2007) , Das (2010) and Gibson (2007) ) that the benefits of CRT will be compromised by the structural concentration of the CDS market. Using financial network modelling we have dealt with these issues in Markose et. al. (2012, forthcoming) in the case of the US CDS market and for the global derivatives markets in Markose (2012, forthcoming) . This paper will show how a MAFN simulation platform based on the US FDIC data base will combine both the stress tests for perverse incentives of Basel II CRT regulation and also the systemic risk from the financial network that arises from the CDS obligations of US banks. We note that in the repertoire of agent based models, the potential for systemic risk from regulatory incentives are the easiest to simulate. In the case for policy incentives for capital reduction-we set the banks to minimize capital as far as it is permitted by the rules of synthetic securitization and the market conditions given by the sub-prime ABX-HE index.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will set out regulatory conditions for capital reduction and also the costs of credit risk mitigation from CDS. The synthetic CDO structure referenced on the ABX-HE tranches which will be replicated in the strategies of the bank agents will be discussed. The questions being asked are as follows: could the US banks that were simultaneously involved in both CDS purchases and RMBS assets, have accumulated the quantities of these assets for capital reduction was amassed on banks' balance sheets for purposes of capital reduction on RMBS. CDS on RMBS was the fastest growing segment of the CDS market and failures to meet obligations arising from these derivatives led to the major tax payer bail out of financial intermediaries in 2008 on grounds of being too interconnected to fail. Section 6 gives a brief discussion of the empirical network characterization of the CDS market and its systemic risk implications. This is followed by a concluding section on the future work needed to extend the scope of MAFN models beyond the example exercise conducted in this paper to one of full automation of access to financial firm level data and as a computational platform for monitoring of systemic risks.
2.The Regulatory and Market Climate ( 2005-2007)
2.1Capital Reduction for US Banks From Synthetic Securitization
In synthetic securitization and CRT, an originating bank uses CDS or guarantees to transfer the credit risk, in whole or in part, of one or more underlying exposures to third-party protection providers. In the typical synthetic securitization, the underlying exposures remain on the balance sheet of the originating bank, but the credit exposure of the originating bank is transferred to the protection provider or covered by collateral pledged by the protection provider. Under Basel I since 1988, a standard 8% regulatory capital requirement applied to banks with very few exceptions for the economic default risk of assets being held by banks. In the run up to Basel II, and its precursor in the US which set out the capital treatment in the Synthetic Collateralized Loan Obligations guidance published by the OCC (OCC 99-43) and the Joint Agencies Rule 66 Fed. Reg. 56914 and 59622
which became effective on January 1, 2002, the 50% risk weight which implied a capital charge of 4% on residential mortgages could be reduced to a mere 1.6% through the process of synthetic securitization and external ratings which implied 5 times more leverage in the system. This strongly incentivized the use of CDS by banks which began to hold more MBS on their balance sheets and also brought AAA players such as AIG, hedge funds and erstwhile municipal bond insurers called
Monolines into the CDS market as protection sellers. By our calculations, which will be explained, this implies capital savings of a minimum of $2.13 bn. 10 Note, JP Morgan was claiming the giant share of this, followed by Citibank. Also the RMBS assets on the balance sheets of these same banks in 2009 Q2 was about $510 bn making the underlying RMBS for which CDS protection was being purchased at about 17 %. 9 The FDIC Call Report code for this is RCFDG404. 10 Assuming a capital charge of 4% on RMBS assets without CDS cover, the capital charge is 1.6% with AAA CDS cover, the savings are 240 basis points. How much asset accumulation can be leveraged from this capital savings depends on the capital charge and the interest rates. This is discussed in Section 3.3. 59614, "the sponsoring banking organization no longer is required to purchase protection on the senior loss position in order to assign a 20 percent risk weight to that position. Rather, it can assign a 20 percent risk weight based on the inferred rating of the subordinate credit linked notes."
Synthetic RMBS Structure For Capital Arbitrage
Based on the above discussion, we aim to determine the capital saved through the process of using CDS for capital arbitrage in the context of the rules for synthetic securitization. Consider the generic partially funded synthetic CDO structure depicted in If the funding behind the mezzanine tranche involves Treasury bonds or cash then it has zero capital weight though the bank incurs the cost of the CDS spread. This may be sufficient for the senior tranche to be allowed a 20% risk weight reduced from either a 50% or 100% without the bank having to incur CDS purchases on the senior tranche. The final $50m first loss exposure is retained and requires a 100% risk weight as it is assumed to be unrated. In what follows we will assume a 20% risk weight for the senior tranche and a zero risk weight for the funded mezzanine tranche. However, as we aim to replicate the ABX-HE index structure, the reference assets of the senior tranche is assumed to be 40% and that of the mezzanine one to be 60%. 14 The mezzanine tranches will follow sub-indexes with ratings of AA, A, BBB, and BBB-of the ABX-HE index. The bank will optimize ownership of those sub-indexes that yield the largest CDS basis return. This will be explained below.
Simulation Model for Regulatory Capital Requirements With CDS Credit Risk Mitigant
CDS Capital Arbitrage Model
Let ε and θ i ,respectively, denote the 8% regulatory capital requirement and the regulatory risk weight on the CDO tranche i without the credit risk mitigant (CRM) and θ i CRM is the risk weight commensurate with credit risk mitigant. The latter is assumed to be issued by an AAA rated company 
λ it : CDS spread at time t given as the annual cost of protection over a N-year period is defined as λ it = [(100-CDS price at time t of ith ABX-HE subindex )/ N*100] + fixed premium θ i : Risk weight on ith CDO tranche without credit risk mitigant θ i CRM : Risk weight on ith CDO tranche with credit risk mitigant y it : CDO bond yield to maturity on the ith tranche at time t r t : Risk free rate at time t Capital saved with CDS based CRT from an AAA guarantor on the senior RMBS tranche is 240 basis points (which is 400 basis points less 160 basis points) and on the mezzanine tranche with zero risk weight, all of the 400 basis points is saved. In a period of zero to negative yields on bonds and high interest rates, the regulatory capital arbitrage via CDS activity may be naturally curtailed as the CDS basis becomes positive. Indeed, equation (1) suggests that the regulatory capital saving incentives are so strong that only in the case of the CDS basis exceeding over 400 basis points will this activity be curtailed.
CDS Carry Trade: Mechanism Explained
The market for a credit derivative and the cash market for the underlying bond of the same maturity need to be aligned to avoid mispricing and arbitrage opportunities. In principle, the CDS spread which reflects the price of credit risk of the bond, as an initial approximation, should be equal to the bond spread for a bond with a given maturity (Duffie, 1999; Hull et. al, 2004) . The bond spread defined as the yield to maturity minus the risk free rate (y t -r t ) includes the price of credit risk of the issuer of the bond while the CDS spread could also include counterparty risk of the CDS protection seller. The so called CDS basis given on the right hand side of (1) is the difference between the CDS spread, λ t and the bond spread (y t -r t ). Under conditions of negative basis, viz. y t − λ t > r t , an investor in a self-financing strategy buys the bond and the CDS cover on it by borrowing at a riskfree rate. In so doing he locks in the carry trade profit equal to ((y t -r t ) -λ t ). If this strategy is widely adopted, the bond price increases, leading to a fall in its yield and an increase in the price of CDS protection, which ultimately cancels out the observed divergence. Conversely, if y t − λ t < r t , the investor should sell the bond (if possible), sell the CDS and invest at a risk-free rate, which ultimately restores equilibrium. is because the CDO tranches offered more yield than cash assets such as corporate bonds with the same ratings while the CDS spreads on the CDO tranches were underpriced. The latter was specially the case for BBB and BBB-tranches. Hamerle et. al (2009) maintain that the demand for CDO tranches arose because investors were guided solely by the tranches' rating and ignore the increased systematic risk for pricing.
Agent Based Model of Capital and CDS Basis Arbitrage Trade Implementation
The regulatory climate, the ensuing rise in CDS market liquidity and the creation of numerous CDS indices provide the underpinnings of the CRT gaming of banking regulation. This regulatory gaming allows banks to benefit on two fronts, firstly from leverage based on reduced capital charges against assets held on their balance sheets as defined in equation 1. Secondly, as holders of the credit exposures, banks are also able to gain additional per-tranche basis or carry-trade income from holding such assets and buying credit protection against them. Using equation (1) we derive the initial pertranche gain or loss, π it ,
Here X i is the $ value of the underlying tranche. It is assumed that the strategy of capital reduction using CDS risk mitigant and the negative CDS carry trade proceed simultaneously when conditions for both overlap. When a negative basis does not prevail but the capital arbitrage is still lucrative, then (2) above becomes the net income from the strategy. Setting i= 1 to be the senior tranche and i= 2 to be the mezzanine tranche, we assume that at time t the net profit from t-1is reinvested between the 2 tranches in terms of 40% and 60%. 16 The mezzanine tranche is then invested in the ABX-HE ratings band that provides the greatest return in terms of CDS basis at time t. Positions are assumed to be held to maturity where the maturity dates follow the vintage of the selected ABX-HE tranche. In the simulation, two factors will affect the growth of banks' holdings of RMBS assets. These are 15 Choudhry (2004 15 Choudhry ( , 2006a provides strong evidence of continuous arbitrage opportunities in the credit risk markets in general. For example as of October 2006, a third of the 150 actively traded US corporate bonds studied had a negative CDS basis of above 10bps with some trading at a basis in excess of 30bps. Choudhry (2005) , further notes that whilst positive basis tend to exist in conventional credit markets, prolonged negative basis are prevalent in structured finance and assetbacked securities markets. 16 This allocation follows the typical ABX-HE tranche allocations at issuance where the senior tranche equates to the AAA rated band. See Table 4 in Stanton and Wallace (2009 
Here, π t-1 = CapSave t-1 + CDS Basis Income t-1 where the first term is the capital savings over all tranches ∑ t-1 ) and likewise for CDS basis income. Note, the term RMBS t in equation (3) include both RMBS which form part of a bank's synthetic securitization (as in Figure 4) as well as CDOs issued by other financial intermediaries. A quarter by quarter revaluation of banks' RMBS structured assets is done and the # term in RMBS # t-1 signifies marking to market of tranches using the ABX-HE prices for the relevant vintage and tranche.
17 If (λ t -(y it -r t )) <0, we will consider a leveraged reinvestment strategy of the t-1 CDS carry trade profits (only if latter was positive at t-1) that will fulfil a self-financing strategy to lock in the risk free "carry" at t . The maximum amount to borrow or leverage up so that the borrowing and regulatory capital costs are self-financed is given by
Lev t max = (CDS Basis Income t-1 / US$ Libor
Note this implies that the interest rate and capital cost of buying the underlying bonds with face value
Lev t max will equal (US$ Libor
The latter will exactly be financed by the CDS basis income at t-1. We use the 3-month US$ Libor and typically in 2006, 180 basis points over Libor was charged for the BBB sub-index (Lucas et. al. (2006) ). The capital charge being applied is 160 basis points. Note all of the funds generated from Lev t max is invested solely in the mezzanine tranche. The growth of RMBS assets in the case of leverage is given as:
Data Used For Simulation
The FDIC Bank Data
The bank data used in the model presented here is taken from the Thrift/Call Reports of FDIC insured banks most active in CDS market, as reported by US operating banks to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This data is available to the public either in form of individually submitted reports or in form of quarterly bulk reports collected into tab delimited CSV files. For each reporting quarter between 2002Q1 and 2010Q2 these tab delimited CSV files were imported into a single MySQL database from which the agent data is extracted based on CDS market participation conditions. In particular, the criteria used to determine the banks for which data is extracted is that -100,000,000
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Total RMBS Holdings All Banks Total CMO Holdings All Banks What can be seen in Figure 8 and Table 1 Figure 9 . In the simulation, from 2006 Q4 end, we will apply the downgrades on the mezzanine tranches as needed. 
Growth of RMBS Holdings by FDIC Banks From Capital Arbitrage
The multi-agent micro-simulation methodology that aims to see how banks will respond to regulatory incentives and other well known arbitrage opportunities given market conditions starts the simulation off at an initial date at which their balance sheet data anchors their strategies. At 2006Q1, the 26 banks that the FDIC data base presents as having both RMBS and CDS activities were found to have $602.34 bn RMBS assets. Thereafter, the agents are only given the market related costs of leverage and the CDS basis and price data at the end of each quarter (items 8-9 in Table 2 ). The rule based strategies given in Section 3.3 are implemented for each bank at the beginning of the each quarter.
The simulation outputs such as the returns/profits of the strategies are tallied up at the end of the same quarter and so are the banks' balance sheet RMBS holdings and off balance sheet demand for CDS purchases. Where applicable the balance sheet RMBS holding are revalued as dictated by the ABX-HE index prices. This is set out in row 3 of Table 2 . Using no extraneous assumptions except those driving capital arbitrage and CDS negative carry trade, we see in Figure 10 that the simulation in the case with leverage almost exactly mirrors the actual RMBS build up on bank's balance sheets. The breakdown of the results is reported in Table 2 . We find that the initial realized aggregate capital savings of $20.23 billion in 2006 Q1 from capital arbitrage which corresponded to CRT rules, helped kick start the CDS carry trade which netted $8.31 billion at the best negative basis for the BBB sub index of the mezzanine tranche. What is clear is that a leveraged self-financing reinvestment of the carry trade profits of $8.31 billion produced a total of $114.367 billion of funds generated in sequence (see Table 2 
Simulated Growth of CDS Demand For Capital Reduction and Network of CDS
Obligations of US banks
In Figure 3 we saw that even in 2009 Q2 FDIC banks reported quite substantial demand for CDS for purposes of capital reduction from CRT. The upshot of the simulation above is that the US banks accumulated in each quarter between $361.4billion in 2006 Q1 to $448.6billion in 2007 Q3 (see Table   2 , row 7) of gross notional of CDS purchases in the form of credit risk mitigants to reduce capital.
Note, the majority of the CDS gross notional outstanding in each quarter is bespoke and arising from pre 2006 synthetic securitization. Only about $100 bn of CDS, in keeping with our carry trade strategy, is on the ABX-HE index per se. 24 Remarkably, the revaluation item in Table 2 row 3 shows that in 2007Q3 a loss of $80 bn on underlying RMBS implies that all of the RMBS assets worth around $157 bn that the banks took on its balance sheets in the period 2006-07Q3 using CRT had lost all of its value. This must have triggered CDS contracts, at a minimum, with a similar net fair/market value. Of all the CDS market participants, because of the CRT scheme, banks faced threat of insolvency from double failure of both the reference RMBS assets on their balance sheets and that of their CDS protection sellers. It was the inability to meet CDS obligations by key CDS protection sellers on subprime related MBS and CDOs that led to implicit or explicit tax payer bail-outs on the premise that these financial entities were too interconnected to fail. 21 The carry trade profit is calculated for the mezzanine tranche which is 60% of $602.335 viz. $333.90 bn. The negative basis is on this is -230 basis points (row 10 in Table 2 ) which gives $8.31 bn as profits at the end of 2006 Q2. 22 $94.759bn is the self-financing leverage generated from the $8.31bn profits (see, row 6 of As already noted only a few, 26-32, FDIC US banks were involved in the US CDS market and the FDIC data gives their activities in their capacity as national associations rather than as global banks.
Our simulations (See Table 2 row 7 and Table 3 row 2), show that CDS on RMBS contributes to only 13% of gross notional of CDS in 2006Q1 which then fell to 7% in 2007Q2. ,504,417,017 3,052,400,980 3,683,156,963 4,232,328,400 5,236,739,940 6,191,517,817 7,476,739 ,120 Gross Notional CDS Protection Purchased by All 26 FDIC Banks 2, 645,092,207 3,166,999,117 3,840,306,007 4,417,891,799 5,422,924,381 6,389,251,797 7,663,403,829 Source: FDIC Call Reports
With CDS on RMBS being the fasted growing segment of credit derivatives which had gross notional (see Table 3 ), we will complete our analysis by coming to the heart of the rationale of CDS based CRT in Basel II and its US precursor in the Joint Agencies Rule 66 Federal Regulation No. 56914.
The premise was that credit protection is spread across those better placed to do this and hence AAA financial institutions primarily in the US began to get involved in this activity. However, similar to the argument made by Darby (1994) about derivatives markets in general, many (see Lucas et. al. 2007 , Das,2010 and Gibson , 2007 bank Monoline and hedge fund CDS market participants (given a calibrated 30% market share as net protection sellers), we see that the concentration of CDS market share in 5 top banks imply very high density of network connections among these banks in terms of bilateral interrelationships and the triangular clustering among them highlights a tiered structure. This can be seen in Figure 12 . 26 The highly asymmetric nature of the empirical CDS network is manifested in the large kurtosis or fat tails in degree distribution which is characterized by a few (two banks in this case) which have a relatively large number of in degrees (up to 17) while many have only a few (as few as 1). In Figure 12 , we have colour coded the net sellers (pink), the net buyers (light blue) and sole buyers (dark blue).
These networks manifest very different propagation of systemic risks from counterparty default than do random graphs which have been mistakenly been used for financial network modelling (see Nier et. al , 2007 for an example of simulations using random networks and see, Craig and von Peter, 2010, for an empirical study of the presence of tiered financial networks with market share concentration). Source : Markose et. al. (2010) Using the Tier 1 capital reported in by these banks in the FDIC call reports, we find that default of any of the top 5 banks based on their bilaterally netted fair value CDS obligations will result typically in the failure of those banks that are highly interconnected amongst themselves. The contagion stops at this point with it being confined to the top hierarchy (as shown in Figure 13 ) but in the spirit of being too interconnected to fail, the top banks (black nodes in Figure 13 ) are brought down when any other member of this group collapses. Clearly, the implicit socialized losses of capital from bank failure with such a topological concentration of counterparties with high CDS market share is very 26 We found empirical the clustering coefficient to be around 92% and the connectivity (ie. probability of any two banks being connected to be 12%.
large as top banks also account for some 43% of Tier 1 capital ($430 bn) of the 26 banks in the sample . 
Conclusion
This paper has provided an exemplar of how publicly available financial firm level FDIC type data bases are to be accessed and 'fed' into multi-agent financial network (MAFN) models to help monitor perverse incentives from policy and systemic risk from a topological perspective especially in risk sharing derivatives institutions.
We fully concur with the Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008) dictum that "understanding causality is a precondition for correct policy making". The question is what methodologies can investigate causality especially in the context of the impact of policy incentives? We have argued that in the design of robust financial regulation a more rigorous 'wind tunnel' testing platform and also a means of monitoring policy for perverse incentives in an on going way is needed over and above what extant macro or cross sectional econometric models can achieve. In the latter equations have to be estimated, while in ACE the cost benefit calculations are algorithms for banks to implement.
Permissible capital arbitrage refers to the least amount of regulatory capital that a bank can hold given market conditions and the myopic cost benefit analysis. At least since the BCBS paper of Jackson et. al (1999) on the impact of the Basle Accord capital requirements on bank behaviour, numerous empirical studies based on econometrics or simple charts and graphs have been undertaken. Few if any of these papers make assessments, in any joined up way, of the impact of regulatory incentives for banks to reduce capital from 8% to 1.6% through the use of CDS. Certainly, the development of large scale computational agent based models that can directly access data from the financial databases was not considered. From a data stand point MAFN models could have been set up for the US banks from 2003 when FDIC Call Reports had publicly available data on all RMBS holdings (broken down in some detail) and CDS activity (not broken down into product classes ). However, the data on the crucial question on purchased CDS protection that is recognized as a guarantee for regulatory capital purposes (FDIC Call Report code RCFDG404) did not get reported till 2009 Q2.
In agent based models, rule following behaviour as in complying with the regulation and the conduct of carry trade activity are relatively easy to implement. This is because unlike fully fledged adaptive behaviour, agents' strategies, intelligence and autonomy are limited to following the letter of the law and strictly verifying conditions for which the most profitable arbitrage applies. The modeller, however, faces the challenge of understanding the regulation, provide market conditions for the triggers that need to be followed in a carry trade and then implement the agents' strategies in an algorithm. We have confined the simulation to the 2006-07 period and restricted the maximum of capital savings in the context of replicating the ABX-HE index. We reiterate that the pursuit of CDS negative carry trade was not the main objective of the banks' strategy but the side effects of the pursuit of capital reduction from the CRT scheme of Basel II. There is clear evidence that the bonanza of the rapid growth of banks' holdings of RMBS and CDS purchases during the 2006-7 period required capital savings from CRT, which we estimate to be about $20bn. The simulation shows that with the application of leverage, RMBS assets for the 26 FDIC banks (viz. those that also reported CDS purchases) peaked at about $750bn in 2007 Q1 (see Table 2 row 2). Maximizing capital savings and minimizing risk weighted assets are two sides of the same coin. The $750bn or so of banks' RMBS assets in 2007 Q1 which we simulated given the regulation on risk weighting, implies risk weighted assets of $60 bn and a meagre Tier 1 capital of $4.8 bn. The fact that $4.8 bn constitutes 8% of risk weighted assets is highly misleading when it is less than 1% of total assets. The latter, ofcourse, corresponds to the buffer needed to cover for probable losses from AAA assets. Gibson (2007) said : " One fundamental reality of credit derivatives is that they do not eliminate credit risk. They merely shift it around. As a result, when the credit cycle turns and default rates rise, someone, somewhere, will lose money." Basel II and III scheme of CRT suffers from the fallacy of composition in that removing credit risk from banks' balance sheets which is good thing from the perspective of the bank (at least for capital savings and short run asset expansion) -the systemic risk consequences of high concentration of counterparties was not quantitatively modelled and visualized. The automated Markose et. al. (2010) and Markose et. al. (2011) network visualizer that uses concentration and market share statistics to calibrate the degree distribution and the actual fair value flows show that Gibson (2007) is far off the mark about who will lose money and the nature of systemic risk. Quite simply a threat to any of the top 5 US banks is an immediate threat to the other four. The network topology where the very high percentage of exposures is concentrated among a few highly interconnected banks implies that they will stand and fall together. Hence, the implied socialized losses are very large and the CDS network structures cannot be supported by a capital base which is eroded by CRT leveraged asset growth.
In a data base driven multi-agent model of the US financial sector, a banks' balance sheet and off balance sheet activities is a vector and form multi-level networks. For instance, even for purposes of this simulation, as noted by Gorton (2009 a) the leveraged funds used by banks (and non-banks) was raised in the repo market. It will be interesting to see how the FDIC banks' repo data will fit in with the simulated demands for leveraged funds from this exercise. Full developments of large scale MAFN models as hyper-networks (see, Johnson, 2006 Johnson, , 2011 are only at its infancy. Integration and automation of financial data bases in an ACE framework aims to transform the data from a document or record view of the world to an object-centric view (see Balakrishnan et. al. 2010) , where multiple facts about the same real-world financial entity are accessed to give a composite visualization of their interactions with other such entities in a scalable way. Based on the above discussions, for purposes of monitoring impact of policy and to detect perverse incentives, we recommend a financial data base driven, constructive or computational modelling of strategies, regulatory frameworks and the analysis of the stability of financial systems done in terms of network stability.
